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Dear Editor, 
 
There is obvious interest in gaining insights into the epidemiology and evolution of the virus that has 
recently emerged in humans as the cause of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The 
recent paper by Forster et al. (1), analyzed 160 SARS-CoV-2 full genomes available 
(https://www.gisaid.org/) in early March 2020. The central claim is the identification of three main SARS-
CoV-2 types, named A, B, and C, circulating in different proportions among Europeans and Americans 
(types A and C) and East Asian (type B). According to a median-joining network analysis, variant A is 
proposed to be the ancestral type because it links to the sequence of a coronavirus from bats, used as an 
outgroup to trace the ancestral origin of the human strains. The authors further suggest that the “ancestral 
Wuhan B-type virus is immunologically or environmentally adapted to a large section of the East Asian 
population, and may need to mutate to overcome resistance outside East Asia”. There are several 
serious flaws with their findings and interpretation. First, and most obviously, the sequence identity 
between SARS-CoV-2 and the bat virus is only 96.2%, implying that these viral genomes (which are 
nearly 30,000 nucleotides long) differ by more than 1,000 mutations. Such a distant outgroup is unlikely to 
provide a reliable root for the network. Yet, strangely, the branch to the bat virus, in Figure 1 of the paper, 
is only 16 or 17 mutations in length. Indeed, the network seems to be mis-rooted because (see 
Supplementary Figure 4) a virus from Wuhan from week 0 (24
th
 December 2019) is portrayed as a 
descendant of a clade of viruses collected in weeks 1-9 (presumably from many places outside China), 
which makes no evolutionary (2), nor epidemiological sense (3). 
As for the finding of three main SARS-CoV-2 types, we must underline that finding different lineages in 
different countries and regions is expected with any RNA virus experiencing founder effects (2). 
According to Forster et al.’s own analysis, a single synonymous mutation (nucleotide change in a gene 
that does not result in a modified protein) distinguishes type A from B, while one nonsynonymous 
mutation (resulting in a protein with a single amino acid change) separates types A and C, and another 
one types B and C. Given SARS-CoV-2’s fast evolutionary rate, random emergence of new mutations is 
entirely expected, even in a relatively short timeframe (4). When a viral strain is introduced and spreads in 
a new population, such random mutations can be propagated without them being selected or 
advantageous due to founder effects. The fact that SARS-CoV-2 sequences show some geographical 
clustering is not new and is nicely and interactively shown on Nextstrain (5), but this cannot be used as a 
proof of biological differences unless backed by solid experimental data (6). This is particularly true for the 
work of Forster et al. since their findings are based on a non-representative dataset of 160 genomes, with 
no significant correlation between prevalence of confirmed cases and number of sequenced strains per 
country (7, 8). The essential role of representative sampling is well documented in the literature (9), but 
was not acknowledged by the authors, who instead claim that their “network faithfully traces routes of 
infections for documented [COVID-19] cases”, without taking in consideration missing viral diversity, or 
evaluating multiple transmission hypotheses that would be consistent with sequence data, or even 
providing any support on the robustness of the branching pattern in their network. Ultimately, no firm 
conclusion should be drawn without evaluating the probability of alternative dissemination routes. 
The inappropriate application and interpretation of phylogenetic methods to analyze limited and unevenly 
sampled datasets begs for restraint about origin, directionality, and early clade/lineage inference of 
SARS-CoV-2. We feel the urgency to reframe the current debate in more rigorous scientific terms given 
the dangerous implications of misunderstanding the true dispersal dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 and the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
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